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Authentication method by activating multiple applications
using SAS-2
Today, password management is a burden, and many people take actions that do
not take security into consideration, such as using passwords and storing cookies. Bio-
metric authentication is attracting attention as an alternative to a password. Biometric
authentication has the merit of being capable of authenticating with a small amount
of labor as well as identifying individuals uniquely. However, due to the development
of technology, the method of stealing biometric information such as ngerprints can be
stealed from data such as photographs is simplied. In response to this, protocols that
can not be authenticated only by theft of biometric information have also been estab-
lished by storing and using another authentication information for the terminal itself.
　 However, these authentication methods are robust against attacks by third parties,
but they are not resistant to attacks by others such as family members and friends.
Within the home, it is easy to steal biometric information such as unauthorized use
of the terminal, memorized authentication information, ngerprints and the like. Also,
even if you are peeking, it is hard to be suspected of being suspicious, and users them-
selves are unlikely to feel a sense of crisis.
　 In this paper, we proposed, built and evaluated authentication method using appli-
cation information installed by individuals on smartphone using SAS - 2 one - time
password authentication method. In the proposed service, the burden of memorizing
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the password is reduced, it is dicult to guess at the movement of the nger, etc., so
that the authentication operation is made dicult to notice. In addition, we show that
by using SAS - 2 for mutual authentication with the server, it is possible to update the
encrypted information without passing it through the communication path.
key words smartphone, application, One-time password, SAS-2
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1. クライアントは地震の識別子 ID を入力し，認証に使用するアプリを起動させてパス
ワードを生成する．また，乱数を生成し，保存する．
2. A = X(ID, SN)を算出する．










1. クライアントは自身の識別子 ID を入力し，認証に使用するアプリを起動させてパス
ワード Sを生成する．
2. 保存された乱数 Nを用い，A = X (ID, S  N)を算出する．次に，クライアントは乱
数 Ni+1 を生成・保存する．さらにクライアントは Ai+1 = X (ID, S  Ni+1)，Fi+1
= F(ID, Ai+1) をそれぞれ求め，α = Fi+1  Ai，β = Ai+1  ( Fi+1  Ai ) をそ
れぞれ算出する．
3. クライアントは，ID，α，βをサーバへ送信する．
4. サーバは受信したαと保存していた Ai を使用して，Fi+1 = α  Ai を算出する．さら





5. サーバは，保存されている Ai の代わりに Ai+1 を保存し，次回認証に備える．さらに，
γ = H(ID, Fi+1) を算出する．
6. サーバは，γをクライアントへ送信する．








































使用アプリ数 [種類] 2 3 4 5
起動～認証操作終了 [s] 12.63 16.81 25.93 30.67
操作終了～認証終了 [s] 0.52 0.61 0.70 0.82




























100P2 = 9; 900（通り）
となる．認証に使用するアプリが何種類かわからない場合，2～5種類全ての順列を足し合
わせると，
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